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REPUTATION AND EQUILIBRIUM CHARACTERIZATION IN 
REPEATED GAMES WITH CONFLICTING INTERESTS 
BY KLAUS M. SCHMIDT
1 
A two-person game is of conflicting interests if the strategy to which player one would 
most like to commit herself holds player two down to his minimax payoff. Suppose there is 
a positive prior probability that player one is a "commitment type" who will always play 
this strategy. Then player one will get at least her commitment payoff in any Nash 
equilibrium of the repeated game if her discount factor approaches one. This result is 
robust against further perturbations of the informational structure and in striking contrast 
to the message of the Folk Theorem for games with incomplete information. 
KEYWORDS: Commitment, Folk Theorem, repeated games, reputation. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
CONSIDER A REPEATED RELATIONSHIP between two long-run players, one of 
whom has some private information about her type. A common intuition is that 
the informed player may take advantage of the uncertainty of her opponent and 
enforce an outcome more favorable to her than that which she would have 
obtained under complete information. This intuition has been called "reputa-
tion effect" and has found considerable attention in the literature. The purpose 
of this paper is to formalize this intuition in a general model of repeated games 
with "conflicting interests" and to show that the effect is robust against 
perturbations of the informational structure of the game. 
The first formalization of reputation effects in games with complete informa-
tion have been developed by Kreps and Wilson (1982) and Milgrom and 
Roberts (1982). They have shown that a small amount of incomplete informa-
tion can be sufficient to overcome Selten's (1978) chain-store paradox. An 
incumbent monopolist who faces a sequence of potential entrants may deter 
entry by maintaining a reputation for "toughness" if there is a small prior 
probability that she is a "tough" type who prefers a price war to acquiescence. 
Recently, this result has been generalized and considerably strengthened by 
Fudenberg and Levine (1989, 1992). They consider the class of all repeated 
games in which a long-run player faces a sequence of short-run opponents, each 
of whom plays only once but observes all previous play. They show that if there 
is a positive prior probability of a "commitment type," who always plays the 
strategy to which player one would most like to commit herself, and if player 
1 This paper is based on Chapter 3 of my Ph.D. thesis which was completed within the European 
Doctoral Programme at Bonn University. Financial support by Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, 
SFB 303 at Bonn University, is gratefully acknowledged. I would like to thank David Canning, 
In-Koo Cho, Eric Maskin, Benny Moldovanu, Georg Nöldeke, Ariel Rubinstein, Avner Shaked, Joel 
Sobel, Monika Schnitzer, Eric van Damme, and in particular Drew Fudenberg, a co-editor, and an 
anonymous referee for many helpful comments and discussions. 1 am also grateful for comments by 
seminar participants at Berkeley, Bonn, Boston, Chicago, Harvard, Mannheim, MIT, Northwestern, 
Penn, Princeton, San Diego, Tilburg, and Vienna Universities. 
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one is sufficiently patient, then she can enforce at least her commitment payoff 
in any Nash equilibrium, i.e. she will get at least what she would have obtained 
if she could have committed herself publicly to this strategy. This result is very 
powerful, because (i) it gives a tight lower bound for player one's payoff in all 
Nash equilibria, (ii) it holds for finitely and infinitely repeated games, and (iii) it 
is robust against further perturbations of the informational structure, i.e. it is 
independent of what other types may exist with positive probability. However, 
Fudenberg and Levine's analysis is restricted to games where a long-run player 
faces a sequence of short-run opponents. Our paper provides a generalization 
and qualification of their results for the two long-run player case. We show that 
a necessary and sufficient condition for this generalization to hold is that the 
game is of conflicting interests. 
To make this more precise, consider a repeated game in which player one 
would like to commit herself to take an action #f, called her "commitment 
action," in every period. If player two responds optimally to a*, player one gets 
her "commitment payoff." Assume that the game is of "conflicting interests" in 
the sense that playing a* holds player two down to his minimax payoff. Now 
suppose that the informational structure of this game is perturbed such that 
player one may be one of several possible "types." Consider a type for whom it 
is a dominant strategy in the repeated game always to play a* and call her the 
"commitment type." Our main theorem says that if the commitment type has 
any arbitrarily small but positive prior probability and if player one's discount 
factor goes to 1, then her payoff in any Nash equilibrium is bounded below by 
her commitment payoff. This result is independent of the nature of any other 
possible types and their respective probabilities. We generalize the theorem to 
the case of two-sided uncertainty. If the game is not of "conflicting interests" 
this lower bound does not apply. However, we show that our result may still 
impose some restriction on the set of equilibrium payoffs. 
The main theorem highlights the importance of the relative patience of the 
two players. Player one has to be sufficiently patient as compared to player two, 
i.e. for any given discount factor 82 < 1 there exists a 5,(ô2) < 1 such that player 
one can enforce his commitment payoff in all Nash equilibria if his discount 
factor satisfies <5, >£,(<52). The importance of the relative patience of the two 
players is most intuitive in the case of a completely symmetric game with 
two-sided uncertainty. If this game has conflicting interests, then it is clearly not 
possible that both players get their most preferred outcomes at the same time. 
However, if one of them is sufficiently more patient (or if the prior probability 
that she is the commitment type is sufficiently higher) then the reputation effect 
works to her advantage. 
In the limit (as 8X approaches 1) our result gives a tight prediction of player 
one's average payoff in any Nash equilibrium—which seems to be in striking 
contrast to the message of the Folk Theorem for repeated games with incom-
plete information. Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) have shown that any feasible 
payoff vector, which gives each player at least his minimax payoff, can be 
sustained as an equilibrium outcome if the game is perturbed in the right way. REPUTATION WITH CONFLICTING INTERESTS  327 
They assume that with some small probability e each player may be one (and 
only one) "crazy" type. This crazy type follows a strategy which is tailored to the 
payoff vector to be sustained as an equilibrium outcome. We follow Fudenberg 
and Maskin in assuming that one particular type (in our case the "commitment" 
type) has positive probability. But our approach differs in that we allow for the 
possibility of arbitrary other types—including the "crazy" types considered by 
Fudenberg and Maskin. Our result shows that no matter what types may 
possibly be drawn by nature and how likely they are to occur, if the "commit-
ment type" is present, if player one is sufficiently patient, and if the game has 
"conflicting interests," then the commitment type will dominate the play and 
player one can guarantee herself the commitment payoff in any Nash equilib-
rium. Thus, in games with conflicting interests the Folk Theorem is not 
"robust" against further perturbations of the informational structure. If we 
allow for the possibility of a commitment type of player one, then, as player 
one's discount factor approaches 1, all equilibria which give her less than her 
commitment payoff disappear. We discuss the relation of our results to the Folk 
Theorem more extensively in Section 4.3. 
A complementary analysis to ours is Aumann and Sorin (1989). For a 
different class of repeated games, coordination games with "common interests," 
they obtain a similar result. However, they have to restrict the possible pertur-
bations to types who act like automata with bounded recall. They show that if 
all strategies of recall zero exist with positive probability, then all pure strategy 
equilibria will be close to the cooperative outcome. In contrast to Aumann and 
Sorin we allow for any perturbation of player one's payoff function and for 
mixed strategy equilibria. Games of "common" and of "conflicting" interests 
are two polar cases. We will discuss them in more detail in Section 5. 
Finally, in a recent paper Cripps and Thomas (1991) characterize the set of 
Nash equilibria of infinitely repeated games with one-sided incomplete informa-
tion in which players maximize the limit of the mean of their undiscounted 
payoffs. Following a different method pioneered by Hart (1985) they also find 
that in games of conflicting interests the informed player can enforce her 
commitment payoff if there is a small prior probability of a commitment type. 
Since there is no discounting, their result seems to indicate that the relative 
patience is not that important after all. However, as we will show in Section 4, 
this interpretation is misleading. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we introduce 
the model following closely Fudenberg and Levine (1989), and we briefly 
summarize their main results. Then we give a counterexample showing that 
their theorem cannot carry over to all repeated games with two long-run 
players. This gives some intuition on how this class has to be restricted. Section 
4 contains our main results. There we generalize Fudenberg and Levine's (1989) 
theorem to the two long-run player case, and we show that the restriction to 
games with "conflicting interests" is a necessary condition for this generaliza-
tion to hold. Furthermore we extend the analysis to the case of two-sided 
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strate how restrictive the "conflicting interests" condition is. We also show that 
even if the game is not of conflicting interests, our results may still be useful to 
restrict the set of equilibrium outcomes. Section 6 concludes and briefly outlines 
several extensions of the model. 
2. DESCRIPTION OF THE GAME 
In most of the paper we consider the following very simple model of a 
repeated game which is an adaptation of Fudenberg and Levine (1989) and 
Fudenberg, Kreps, and Maskin (1990) to the two long-run player case. The two 
players are called "one" (she) and "two" (he). In every period they move 
simultaneously and choose an action at out of their respective action sets Ah 
/e{l,2}. Here we will assume that the A; are finite sets.
2 As a point of 
reference consider the unperturbed game (with complete information) first. Let 
gi{ai,a2) denote the payoff function of player / in the unperturbed stage game 
g depending on the actions taken by both players. Let denote the set of all 
mixed strategies a, of player i and (in an abuse of notation) gi(a],a2) the 
expected stage game payoffs. 
The 7-fold repetition of the stage game g is denoted by G
r, where T may be 
finite or infinite. We will deal in most of the paper with the infinite horizon case 
but all of the results carry over immediately to finitely repeated games if T is 
large enough. In the repeated game the overall payoff for player / from period t 
onwards (and including period t) is given by 
(1) vi'=L8j-'8j, 
T = t 
where 5, denotes her (his) discount factor (0 < <5, < 1). Our results are stated in 
terms of average discounted payoffs vh where 
oc 
(2) r, = (l-5,)-K' = (l-51)- £«5I-'g,
T-
7= 1 
After each period both players observe the actions that have been taken. They 
have perfect recall and can condition their play on the entire past history of the 
game. Let h
l be a specific history of the repeated game out of the set 
H
l = (Ai XA2)
1 of all possible histories up to and including period /. A pure 
strategy s, for player / in the repeated game is a sequence of maps s-: 
H'~
l ->Ai. Correspondingly, let ai = (cr/,a;
2, • • • ) denote a mixed (behavioral) 
strategy of player /, where o/: Z/'
-1-»^. For notational convenience the 
dependence on history is suppressed if there is no ambiguity. The set of all pure 
(mixed) strategies is denoted by S{ (£, respectively). 
2 See Section 6 for the extension to extensive form stage games, continuous strategy spaces, and 
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Let B: srfx^> stf2 be the best response correspondence of player two in the 
stage game and define
3 
(3) a* = argmax min g\(a{, a2) 
as the "commitment action" and 
(4) g*= min gx(a*,a2) 
a2Gß(u,) 
as the "commitment payoff' of player one. That is gf is the most player one 
could guarantee for herself in the stage game if she could commit to any pure 
strategy ax ^Ax. Note that the minimum over all a2<EB(ax) has to be taken 
since player two may be indifferent between several best responses to ax in 
which case he may take the response player one prefers least.
4 
Furthermore, let a* e B(a* ) denote any strategy of player two which is a best 
response to a* and define 
(5) s?=s2(«r,«?)-
So g2 is the most player two would get in the stage game if player one were 
committed to A*. Suppose B(a*) # &f2 (otherwise the game is "trivial" because 
player one's commitment payoff is her maxmin payoff). Then there is an 








Note that the maximum exists because it is taken over the finite set of all (pure) 
actions a2 £ B(a*). So g2 is the maximum player two can get if he does not take 
an action which is a best response against A*, given that player one takes her 
commitment action. Finally, define the maximal payoff player two can get at all 
as 
(7) g2 = max max g2(ax,a2). 
Clearly, in the repeated game it must be true that 
(8) k2'< Ê«r''i2~^2' 




3 Note that a* is defined in terms of the stage game. In the repeated game player one may want 
to commit herself to a more complex strategy which may be nonstationary and dependent on history, 
e.g. the "tit-for-tat" strategy in the repeated prisoner's dilemma. All our results hold for history 
dependent commitment strategies, but nothing is gained by this generalization. Games in which it is 
strictly desirable to commit to a history dependent strategy do not have conflicting interests as will 
become clear in Section 5.3. Thus, for notational convenience we restrict attention to stationary 
commitment strategies. The analysis can also be extended to the more general case where player 
one would like to commit himself to a mixed strategy. See Fudenberg and Levine (1992) and the 
remarks in Section 6. 
4 Fudenberg and Levine (1989) refer to g* as the "Stackelberg payoff." However, it is now 
customary to use this expression only for max0j maxa2<= gx(ax, a2), that is for the maximum  payoff player one could get if he could publicly commit himself to any action a, and player two 
chooses the best response player one prefers most. However, for generic games (in the space of 
payoff functions) the best reply of player two against a* is unique. See Fudenberg (1992). 330  KLAUS M. SCHMIDT 
Consider now a perturbation of this complete information game such that in 
period 0 (before the first stage game is played) the "type" of player one is drawn 
by nature out of a countable set Q = (ù)0,a>l, • • • ) according to the probability 
measure fi. Player one's payoff function now additionally depends on her type, 
so gx: Ax XA2 X Ü -> U. The perturbed game G
T{i±) is a game with incomplete 
information in the sense of Harsanyi (1967-68). In the perturbed game a 
strategy of player one may not only depend on history but also on her type, so 
cr{: H'~
l xfl^>&fx. Two types out of the set ft are of particular importance: 
• The "normal" type of player one is denoted by a>0. Her payoff function is 
the same as in the unperturbed game: 
(9) gi(aì,a2,ù)0) = gx(aXìa2). 
In many applications fi((x)0) will be close to 1. However, we have to require only 
that JJL(Ù)0) = /x° > 0. 
• The "commitment" type is denoted by a>*. For her it is a dominant strategy 
in the repeated game always to play a*. This is for example the case if her 
payoff function satisfies 
(10) g,(uf,a2,u>*) =g,(flf,fl'2,û>*) >gl(al,a'2,<o*) 
for all ax af, ax ^Ax, and all a2,a2 ^A2. The dominant strategy property in  the repeated game implies that in any Nash equilibrium player one with type <o* 
has to play a* in every period along the equilibrium path. This in turn implies 
that if ju,(co*) = /X* > 0, then with positive probability there exists a history in any 
Nash equilibrium with s\ = a* for all t. The set of all such histories is denoted 
by H*. 
We will now restate an important lemma of Fudenberg and Levine (1989) 
about statistical inference which is basic to the following analysis. The lemma 
says that if co* has positive probability and if player two observes a* being 
played in every period, then there is a fixed finite upper bound on the number 
of periods in which player two will believe a* is "unlikely" to be played. The 
intuition for this result is the following. Consider any history in 
which player one has always played a* up to period t - 1. Suppose player two 
believes that the probability of a* being played in period / is smaller than 77, 
0 < 77 < 1. If player two observes a* being played in / he is "surprised" to some 
extent and will update his beliefs. Because the commitment type chooses a* 
with probability 1 while player two expected a* to be played with a probability 
bounded away from 1 it follows from Bayes' Law that the updated probability 
that he faces the commitment type has to increase by an amount bounded away 
from 0. However, this cannot happen arbitrarily often because the updated 
probability of the commitment type cannot become bigger than 1. This gives the 
upper bound on the number of periods in which player two may expect a* to be 
played with a probability less than 7?. Note that this argument is independent of 
the discount factors of the two players. 
To put it more formally: Each (possibly mixed) strategy profile (al,a2) 
induces a probability distribution IT over (A{ XA2T Xß. Given a history h
l~
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let 7r'(a*) be the probability attached by player two to the event that the 
commitment strategy is being played in period t, i.e. ir'ia*) = ProbCsj = 
a*\h'~
{). Note that since /z'
-
1 is a random variable ir'ia*) is a random variable 
as well. Fix any TT, 0 < TT < 1, and consider any history h induced by {ax,a2). 
Along this history let ni^ia*) < TT) be the number (possibly infinite) of the 
random variables Tr'(#*) for which ir'ia*) < TT. Again, since h is a random 
variable, so is n. 
LEMMA 1: Let 0 < TT < 1. Suppose tt(o>*) = tt* > 0, and that (ax,a2) are such 
that Prob(/z e//*|a>*)= 1. Then 




Furthermore, for any infinite history h such that the truncated histories ht all have 
positive probability and such that a* is always played, tt(<o*|/z,) is nondecreasing 
in t. 
PROOF: See Fudenberg and Levine (1989), Lemma 1. 
One feasible strategy for player one with type CÜ0 is of course to mimic the 
commitment type and always to play a*. Lemma 1 does not say that in this case 
fi((ü*\h{ e. /z*) converges to 1, i.e. that player two will gradually become con-
vinced that he is facing a>* if he observes a* always being played. Rather it says 
that if he observes a* being played in every period he cannot continue to 
believe that a* is "unlikely" to be played. 
Suppose that player two is completely myopic, that is he is only interested in 
his payoff of the current period. Fudenberg and Levine show that there is a 
TT < 1 such that if the probability that player one will play a* is bigger than TT, 
then a short-run player two will choose a best response against a*. Thus, if 
player one mimics the commitment type, then by Lemma 1 her short-run 
opponents will take a2 £ B(a*) in at most k = log n*/\og TT periods. The worst 
that can happen to player one is that these k periods occur in the beginning of 
the game and that in each of these periods she gets 
(12) g, = min g,(ût,a2). 
This argument provides the intuition for the following theorem. 
THEOREM 1 (Fudenberg-Levine): Let 82 = 0, tt(co°) > 0, and n(œ*) = tt* > 0. 
Then there is a constant /c(tt*) otherwise independent of (i7, tt), such that 
(13) U,(Ô, , M* ; a*
0) > (i - ôf
<M*>) • f, + ôf • , 
where vl(8i, tt*; co°) is any average equilibrium payoff to player one with type coQ in 
any Nash equilibrium of G°°(tt). 332  KLAUS M. SCHMIDT 
If Sx goes to 1 the "normal" type of player one can guarantee herself on 
average at least her commitment payoff no matter what other types may be 
around with positive probability. The result is discussed in more detail in 
Fudenberg and Levine (1989). Note however that Theorem 1 is crucially based 
on the assumption that player two is completely myopic. If he cares about future 
payoffs, then he may trade off short-run losses against long-run gains. Thus, 
even if he believes that a* will be played with a probability arbitrarily close or 
equal to 1, he may take an action a2 which is not a short-run best response 
against a*. One intuitive reason for this could be that he might invest in 
screening the different types of player one. Even if this yields losses in the 
beginning of the game the investment may well pay off in the future. This leads 
Fudenberg and Levine to conclude that their result does not apply to two 
long-run player games. The main point of our paper, however, is to show that 
for a more restricted class of games a similar result holds in the two long-run 
players case as well. Since player two's discount factor is smaller than 1, the 
returns from an investment may not be delayed too far to the future. He will not 
"test" player one's type arbitrarily often if the probability that she will play a* 
is always arbitrarily close to 1. This idea will be used in Section 4 to prove an 
analog of Theorem 1 for two long-run player games. 
3. A GAME NOT OF CONFLICTING INTERESTS 
Before establishing our main result let us show that Theorem 1 does not carry 
over to all repeated games with two long-run players. We give a counterexam-
ple of a game in which the normal type of player one cannot guarantee herself 
almost her commitment payoff in all Nash equilibria. The example is instructive 
for two reasons. First, it shows how to construct an equilibrium in which the 
normal type of player one gets strictly less than her commitment payoff. This 
equilibrium is not only a Nash but a sequential equilibrium which survives all 
standard refinements. Second, the construction leads to a necessary and suffi-
cient condition on the class of games for which Theorem 1 can be generalized to 
the two long-run player case. 
Consider an infinite repetition of the following stage game with three types of 
player one (see Figure 1). Player one chooses between U and D and her payoff 
is given in the upper left corners of each cell. Clearly the normal type of player 
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one would like to publicly commit always to play U which would give her a 
commitment payoff of 10 per period in every Nash equilibrium. For the 
commitment type it is indeed a dominant strategy in the repeated game always 
to play U. The indifferent type, however, is indifferent between U and D no 
matter what player two does. 
If 0.75 <<5, < 1 and 0.95 <62< 1, then the following strategies and beliefs 
form a sequential equilibrium of G
00: 
• Normal type of player one: "Play U. If you ever played D, switch to playing 
D forever." 
• Commitment type of player one: "Always play £/." 
• Indifferent type of player one: "Always play U along the equilibrium path. If 
there has been any deviation by any player in the past switch to playing D 
forever." 
• Player two: "Alternate between 19 times L and 1 times R along the 
equilibrium path. If player one ever played D, switch to R forever. If player two 
himself deviated in the last period, play L in the following period. If player one 
reacted to the deviation by playing U, go on playing L forever. If she reacted 
with D, play R forever." 
• Beliefs: Along the equilibrium path beliefs don't change. If player two ever 
observes D to be played, he puts probability 0 on the commitment type. If 
player one reacts to a deviation of player two by playing U, the indifferent type 
gets probability 0. In both cases the respective two other types may get arbitrary 
probabilities which add up to 1. 
In the limit, as S, -> 1, these strategies give the normal type of player one a 
payoff of 
(14) lim =9.5 < 10=gf. 
Why is this an equilibrium? Consider the normal type of player one. Clearly 
she would like to signal that she is the normal or the commitment type. Since all 
three types of player one always play U along the equilibrium path the only way 
to transmit information about her type is to play D. However, playing D "kills" 
the commitment type, because for her it is a dominant strategy always to play U. 
But without the commitment type it is impossible to get rid of the "bad" 
equilibrium (D, R). What about player two? He expects U always to be played 
along the equilibrium path. Nevertheless he plays /?, which is not a short-run 
best response, in every twentieth period. His problem is that he faces the 
indifferent type with positive probability. If he chooses L when he is supposed 
to play /?, then this might trigger a continuation equilibrium against the 
indifferent type which gives him far less than that which he would have obtained 
from playing against the normal or commitment type of player one. It is this risk 
which sustains the equilibrium outcome. 
Note that there are very few restrictions imposed on the updating of beliefs in 
information sets which are not reached on the equilibrium path. The example 
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probability 0, which is perfectly reasonable given that for her it is a dominant 
strategy in the repeated game always to play U. 
To what extent does the example rely on the existence of the indifferent type? 
Without the indifferent type it is still possible to construct a Nash equilibrium 
which gives player one less than her commitment payoff. Actually, this is very 
simple: The normal and the commitment type of player one always play U along 
the equilibrium path. After any deviation they switch to playing D forever. 
Player two alternates playing one period L and one period R. If there has been 
any deviation, he plays R forever. If the discount factors are high enough these 
strategies form a Nash equilibrium for any JJL* > 0. Here the average payoff of 
the normal type of player one is 5. Note, however, that this equilibrium is not 
sequential. It requires for example that the commitment type plays D off the 
equilibrium path.
5 
What sustains both equilibria is the possibility of a continuation equilibrium 
which punishes player two if he plays his short-run best response against a* in 
periods when he is supposed not to do so. Note that this construction does not 
work if player two is already held down to his minimax payoff by the commit-
ment strategy of player one, since in this case nothing worse can happen to him. 
In the next section we show that this is the only case in which Fudenberg and 
Levine's result can be generalized to the two long-run player case. 
4. MAIN RESULTS 
4.1. The Theorem 
Suppose that the commitment strategy of player one holds player two down to 
his minimax payoff. In this case there is no "risk" in playing a best response 
against because player two cannot get less than his minimax payoff in any 
continuation equilibrium. This motivates the following definition: 
DEFINITION 1: A game g is called a game of conflicting interests with respect 
to player one if the commitment strategy of player one holds player two down to 
his minimax payoff, i.e. if 
(15) g* =g2{a*,a*2) = min maxg2(a,, a2). 
"Conflicting interests" are a necessary and sufficient condition for our main 
result. Note that the definition puts no restriction on the possible perturbations 
of the payoffs of player one. It is a restriction only on the commitment strategy 
and on the payoff function of player two. We will discuss this class of games 
extensively and give several examples in Section 5. Clearly, in a game with 
conflicting interests player two can guarantee himself in any continuation 
5 Whether there exists ^sequential equilibrium in which player one gets substantially less than 10 
if there are only the normal and the commitment type around is an open question. Note, however, 
that we want to characterize equilibrium outcomes which are robust to general perturbations of the 
informational structure of the game. From this perspective it makes little sense to restrict attention 
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equilibrium after any history h, at least 
1 
1-5,  (16) vr
l = T^-r-&-
>2 
This is crucial to establish the following result: 
LEMMA 2: Let g be a game of conflicting interests with respect to player one and 
let = /i* > 0. Consider any Nash equilibrium (â],â2) and any history h
l 
consistent with this equilibrium in which player one has always played a*. Suppose 
that, given this history, the equilibrium strategy of player two prescribes to take 
s2
+
1 £ B(a*) with positive probability in period t + 1. For any 82, 0 < 82 < 1, there 
exists a finite integer M, 
In ( 1 - 52) + In ( g? - g2) - In (g9 - g2)  (17) M > N = — ^-f — — > 0, 
In 82 








such that in at least one of the periods t + 1, t + 2,- • -, t + M the probability that 
player one does not take a*, given that he always played a* before, must be at 
least e. 
PROOF: See Appendix. 
Let us briefly outline the intuition behind this result. Because g is of 
conflicting interests player two can guarantee himself at least V2
l
 +
1 = g*/(l - 82) 
in any continuation equilibrium after any history hr Therefore, if he tries to test 
player one's type and takes an action s2
+
1 £ B(a*) in period t + 1 this must give 
him an expected payoff of at least V2
t+] for the rest of the game. If player one 
chooses flf with a probability arbitrarily close or equal to 1, then choosing an 
action a2£B(a*) yields a "loss" of at least g* -g2>0 in this period. Recall 
that g2 is defined as the maximal payoff player two gets if he does not take a 
best response against a*. On the other hand, g2 is an upper bound on what 
player two may get in any period in which player one does not take her 
commitment action, and—of course—he cannot get more than g2 if she plays 
«f. But if future payoffs are bounded and 82 < 1, then the compensation for an 
expected loss today must not be delayed too far to the future. The numbers M 
and e are constructed such that if player two takes a strategy s2
+l £B(a*) in 
period t + 1, then it cannot be true that in each of the next M periods the 
probability that player one takes her commitment action is bigger than (1 - e). 
Otherwise player two would get less than his minimax payoff in equilibrium, a 
contradiction. Note that this argument also holds for finitely repeated games if 
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Lemma 2 holds in any proper subform of G as long as player one always 
played a* in the history up to that subform. Thus if player two chooses actions 
a2£B(a*) along A* in n M periods, then in at least n of these periods the 
probability that player one does not play A* must be at least e. Together with 
Lemma 1 this implies our main theorem: 
THEOREM 2: Let g be of conflicting interests with respect to player one and let 
/i(w
0)>0, and fji(ü)*) = i±* > 0. Then there is a constant k{ii*,82) otherwise 
independent of (41,/x), such that 
(19) ^(5p52>M*;«°)>(l-8f
(''*^>)-gI+ô*^>-gf, 
where ^(S^ S2,a>°) is any average equilibrium payoff of player one with type 
o)0 in any Nash equilibrium of G%fi). 
PROOF: Consider the strategy for the normal type of player one of always 
playing a*. Take the integer M = [N] + 1, where [TV] is the integer part of /V, 
and a real number e > 0, where TV and e are defined in Lemma 2. By Lemma 2 
we know that if player two takes an action a2 £ B(a*), then there is at least one 
period (call it rx) among the next M periods in which the probability that player 
one will play a* (denoted by TT*) is smaller than (1 - e). So 
(20) TT* < 1 -e = r?. 
However, by Lemma 1 we know that 
In AI* 
(21) TT  n(rrf < TT) >  0. 
That is, the probability that player one takes her commitment action cannot be 
smaller than TT in more than In n*/\X\TT periods. Therefore, player two cannot 




 } In(l-e) 
times. Substituting M = [N]+ 1 and e from Lemma 2, we get 
(23) *(^,«2)-([A/] + l)--
82-82 J 
In the worst case player two chooses these actions in the first /C(A<*, 82) periods. 
This gives the lower bound of the theorem. Q.E.D. 
If —> 1 (keeping 82 fixed), then the equilibrium payoff of the normal type of 
player one is bounded below by her commitment payoff. Thus, in the limit our 
theorem gives the same lower bound as Fudenberg and Levine's theorem does 
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Their result can be obtained as a special case of Theorem 2 for the class of 
games with conflicting interests. Note that if 82 goes to 0, then N goes to 0. So 
In /i* In /X* 




Si ~S2l \S2-S2 
In a game with conflicting interests a short-run player two will play a best 
response against a* if 
(25) g*>7r-g2 + (l-ir)-g2 
or, equivalently, if 
(26) 7T>^—^=77. 
£2-^2 
Using (26) in Lemma 1 immediately implies Theorem 1. 
It is important to note that the lower bound given in Theorem 2 depends on 
the discount factor of player 2. If 82 increases, so does /c(/x*, ô2), and the lower 
bound is reduced. Hence, to obtain his commitment payoff in equilibrium, 
player one has to be sufficiently patient as compared to player two. The 
following corollaries elaborate on the importance of the relative patience of the 
players. 
COROLLARY 1: For any 82 < 1, At* > 0 and e > 0, there exists a 8X(82, /x*, e) < 
1, such that for any <5, ^ 8X(82, fi*, e) the average payoff of the normal type of 
player one is at least g* — e. 
PROOF: Choose 8X such that 
(27) gt-e = (1 -S*<^>) - g, +5f°
4*'
Ô2)-g*. 







y Si Si 
Clearly, if <5, > 8x(fjL*, <52, s), then 
(29) LU(ôl,82,f,*;w")>(\-ô^*^)-gi+8^*-^-gt 
Q.E.D. 
COROLLARY 2: Consider any sequence {S^}, 8'{ < 1, lim„ _Œ <52'= 1
 and fa 
e > 0. Then there exists a sequence {5"), 8" < 1, lim„ ^x 5" = 1, such that for any 
{8", ô2'} the average payoff of the normal type of player one is bounded below by 
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PROOF: Take any {8%} and fix e > 0. Choose {5;'} -> 1 such that 8[
l > 
8^8%, M*> e) f°
r all fl> where S,(Ô2, M*> e) is given by (28). Then the result follows 
immediately from the previous corollary. Q.E.D. 
Corollary 2 shows that there is an area in the (8U £2)-space such that for any 
sequence {S", S£} -> (1,1) in this area player one gets at least her commitment 
payoff (up to an arbitrarily small e) for any pair of discount factors along this 
sequence. Note, however, that lim^^d - ô,)/(l - 82) = 0, i.e. in the limit 
player one is infinitely more patient than player two. This observation helps to 
understand a related result of Cripps and Thomas (1991) who consider repeated 
games without discounting, in which players maximize the limit of the mean of 
their payoffs. Under slightly stronger conditions on the possible perturbations 
they show that if the game has conflicting interests and if there is a positive 
prior probability of a commitment type, then player one gets at least her 
commitment payoff as the Banach limit of the mean of her stage game payoffs. 
However, the case of no discounting obscures the role of the relative patience of 
the players. We can give examples of equilibria in games with conflicting 
interests where 8{ -» 1, 82 -> 1, lim^^d - - 82) > 0, and player one's 
equilibrium payoff is bounded away from her commitment payoff for any 
{8",82} along this sequence. Thus, if player one is not patient enough as 
compared to player two, our lower bound does not apply. 
If player one has to be much more patient than player two, the reader might 
be left with the impression that we are essentially back to Fudenberg and 
Levine (1989) where a long-run player faces a sequence of short-run players. 
However, this is not the case. First, Fudenberg and Levine's result requires 
82 = 0 while here 82 may be arbitrarily close to 1. Second, we are going to show 
in the next subsection that, whenever the game is not of conflicting interests, it 
is possible to find an equilibrium which violates Fudenberg and Levine's lower 
bound no matter how much more patient player one is as compared to player 
two. Thus, there is a fundamental difference between repeated games in which 
one player does not care at all about her future payoffs and games in which she 
does care but is less patient than her opponent. Finally, the importance of the 
relative patience of the two players is very intuitive as will be shown after we 
have introduced the case of two-sided uncertainty in subsection 4.3. 
4.2. Necessity of the "Conflicting Interests" Condition 
The question arises whether Theorem 2 also holds for games which are not of 
conflicting interests. If the game is not "trivial" in the sense that player one's 
commitment payoff is equal to her minimax payoff,
6 the answer is no. 
PROPOSITION 1: Let g be a nontrivial game which is not of conflicting interests. 
Then for any e > 0 there is an 77 > 0 and a 82< I such that the following holds: 
6 It is well known that a player can always guarantee herself at least her minimax payoff in any 
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There is a perturbation of g, in which the commitment type of player 1 has positive 
probability and the normal type has probability (1 - e), and there is a sequential 
equilibrium of this perturbed game, such that the limit of the average payoff of the 
normal type of player one for 5, —> 1 is bounded away from her commitment 
payoff by at least rf for any 82 > 82. 
PROOF: See Appendix. 
Proposition 1 shows that the condition of conflicting interests is not only 
sufficient but also necessary for Theorem 2 to hold; in fact, it is a little bit 
stronger than that in two respects. First, it says that if the game is not of 
conflicting interests, then it is not only possible to find a Nash equilibrium which 
violates Fudenberg and Levine's lower bound, but also to find a sequential 
equilibrium. As has been indicated in Section 3, the construction of a Nash 
equilibrium using threats which are not credible is much simpler. Secondly, 
Theorem 2 only requires that juXco
0) > 0 in the perturbed game. So we could 
have established necessity by constructing a perturbation which gives a high 
prior probability to an "indifferent" type who credibly threatens to punish any 
deviation of player two from the equilibrium path we want to sustain. However, 
in many economic applications it is natural to assume that JLL(CO°) is close to 1. 
This is why we provide a stronger proposition which says that even if fi(co°) is 
arbitrarily close to 1 it is possible to construct a sequential equilibrium in which 
the payoff of the normal type of player one is bounded away from gf. 
Note that in Proposition 1 8X -> 1, while 82 is fixed, so player one may be 
arbitrarily more patient than player two. Thus, Proposition 1 shows that there is 
an important difference between games with two long run players, one of whom 
is more patient than the other, and games in which a long-run player faces a 
sequence of short-run players. In the latter, Fudenberg and Levine's bound 
holds for all stage games; in the former, it holds only for games with conflicting 
interests. 
4.3. Two-sided Incomplete Information and Two-sided Conflicting Interests 
If there are two long-run players it is most natural to ask what happens if 
there is two-sided uncertainty. Our result can be extended to this case in the 
following way. Suppose the game is perturbed such that there is incomplete 
information about both the payoff functions of player one and player two. Let 
<a; denote player /'s type which is drawn by nature in the beginning of the game 
out of the countable set 47, according to the probability measure /xf-, /e{l,2}. 
Let co® and œ* represent the normal and the commitment types, respectively. 
Finally, suppose that the game is of conflicting interests with respect to player /, 
i.e. player z's commitment strategy holds player j down to his minimax payoff. 
Without loss of generality let / = 1. Now consider the normal type of player two. 
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which is not a best response against player one's commitment strategy. He might 
do so because he wants to test player one's type or because he wants to build up 
a reputation himself. No matter what the reason is, Lemma 2 states that if he 
takes a2 <£ B(a*), then he must expect that player one chooses s\ a* in one of 
the following periods with strictly positive probability. This argument holds for 
the normal type of player two no matter what other possible types of player two 
exist with positive probability. 
A possible strategy of player one still is to play a* in every period. If she faces 
the normal type of player two, then by Theorem 2 there are at most k(fi*,82) 
periods in which player two will not play a best response against a*. In the 
worst case for player one this happens in the first k periods of the game. On the 
other hand, if she does not face the normal type of player two her expected 
payoff is at least gx in every period. This argument establishes a lower bound 
for the expected payoff of the normal type of player / which is given in the 
following theorem. 
THEOREM 3: Let g be of conflicting interests with respect to player i and let 
/Jiiiü)®) = > 0 and AI,(CO*) = ti* > 0, /e {1,2}. Then there are constants 
kii/x^ôj), otherwise independent of (ß^ßy,^,), such that 
(30) i;,(5,,5y,^M>°) > (l-vW^'^ + WÎ^'-'W 
where ^-(Sj, 82, it*, iiy; (o®) is any average equilibrium payoff of player i with type 
co® in any Nash equilibrium of G°°(/x). 
Thus, if the probability of the normal type of player two is close to 1 and if 
player one is very patient, then the lower bound for her average payoff is again 
close to her commitment payoff. 
What can be said if g has two-sided conflicting interests, i.e. if each player 
would like to commit to a strategy which holds his opponent down to his 
minimax payoff? Of course, if there are two-sided conflicting interests and if 
both players are equally patient, it is impossible that each of them gets his most 
preferred payoff. But suppose that <5, and 8j differ. The bigger player y's 
discount factor, the bigger is Sy), i.e. the number of periods in which 
player / must expect that a strategy other than the best response against her 
commitment strategy is played, and the lower is her lower bound. On the other 
hand, if 8j is kept fixed and 8; goes to 1, then this k periods become less and 
less important, and in the limit player / will get his commitment payoff. This is 
very intuitive. In a symmetric game with conflicting interests reputation building 
has an effect only if one of the parties is sufficiently more patient than the other. 
Theorems 2 and 3 are in striking contrast to the message of the Folk Theorem 
for games with incomplete information by Fudenberg and Maskin (1986). The 
Folk Theorem says that for any finitely or infinitely repeated game there exists 
an e perturbation of this game (in which each of the players has a different 
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rational, feasible payoff vector can be sustained as the outcome of a sequential 
equilibrium of the perturbed game, if the players are sufficiently patient.
7 To 
sustain any particular payoff vector as an equilibrium outcome the "right" 
perturbation has to be chosen, that is there must be one particular "crazy" type 
with probability s who sustains this equilibrium by following a particular 
strategy. Theorems 2 and 3 show that this result is not robust against further 
perturbations of the informational structure. If one of the players is patient 
enough and if her commitment type has positive probability, then—no matter 
what other types are around with positive probability—Theorems 2 and 3 
impose a tight restriction on the set of equilibrium outcomes in any Nash 
equilibrium. 
We have to be very precise here in what is meant by "robustness." Fudenberg 
(1992) argues that strict equilibria can be constructed to prove the Folk 
Theorem. Thus, if the discount factor is kept fixed, the equilibrium is not upset 
by introducing arbitrary additional types with a very small probability. In this 
sense the Folk Theorem is robust. However, if we introduce different types 
(including the commitment type) with a very small probability, keep the pertur-
bation fixed, and then let the discount factor of player one go to 1, then all 
equilibria which give player one less than his commitment payoff will eventually 
break down. Thus, if we are interested in the set of equilibria for 8X -> 1, the 
Folk Theorem is not robust against small perturbations of the informational 
structure. 
5. EXAMPLES 
5.1. The Chain Store Game 
Consider the classical chain store game, introduced by Selten (1978), with two 
long-run players. In every period the entrant may choose to enter a market (/) 
or to stay out (O), while the monopolist has to decide whether to acquiesce (A) 
or to fight (F). Assume that the payoffs of the unperturbed stage game are given 
in Figure 2. 
The monopolist would like to commit to fight in every period which would 
give her a commitment payoff of 3 and which would hold the entrant down to 0. 
Since 0 is also player two's minimax payoff, the game is—according to our 
definition—of conflicting interests with respect to the monopolist. Kreps and 
Wilson (1982) have analyzed finite repetitions of this game with some incom-
plete information about the monopolist's type. For a particular perturbation of 
player one's payoff function they have shown that there are sequential equilibria 
in which the monopolist gets on average almost her commitment payoff if her 
discount factor is close enough to 1 and if there are enough repetitions. 
However, Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) demonstrated that any feasible payoff 
7 Fudenberg and Maskin's Folk Theorem for games with incomplete information considers only 
finitely repeated games without discounting. However, the extension to discounting and an infinite 
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vector which gives each player more than his minimax payoff, i.e. any point in 
the shaded area of Figure 2, can be sustained as an equilibrium outcome if the 
"right" perturbation is chosen. Thus, our Theorem 2 considerably strengthens 
the result of Kreps and Wilson (1982). It says that the only Nash equilibrium 
outcome of this game which is robust against any perturbation gives the 
monopolist at least her commitment payoff of 3 (note that she cannot get more), 
if she is sufficiently patient as compared to the entrant.
8 Furthermore it shows 
that this result carries over to the infinitely repeated game. 
Now suppose that there is also incomplete information about the payoff 
function of the entrant. He would like to commit to enter in every period which 
would give him a commitment payoff of 2 while it would hold the monopolist 
down to 1, her minimax payoff. So the game is also of conflicting interests with 
respect to the entrant and our theorem applies. If there is two-sided uncer-
tainty, Proposition 2 says that it all depends on the relative patience of the two 
players and the prior probability distribution. If player one is sufficiently more 
patient than player two and if the probability of the normal type of player two is 
close to 1, then player one will get her commitment payoff in any Nash 
equilibrium, and vice versa.
9 
5.2. A Repeated Bargaining Game 
Consider a buyer (b) and a seller (s) who bargain repeatedly in every period 
on the sale of a perishable good. The valuation of the buyer is 1 and the 
production costs of the seller are 0. Suppose there is a sealed bid double 
auction in every period: Both players simultaneously submit bids ph and ps, 
Pi <E {1 /n, 2/n,- • -,n/n}, and there is trade at price p = (ph + ps)/2 if and only 
if ph>ps. Consider the commitment strategy of the buyer. She would like to 
commit herself to offer /?* = 1/n in every period. The unique best reply of the 
8 I am grateful to Eric van Damme for the following observation: Theorem 2 does not imply that 
the average payoff of player two is 0. Recall that player one is more patient than player two. So it 
may be that in the beginning of the game, say until period L, she gets less than 3 and player two 
gets more than 0, but after period L payoffs are always (3,0). For player one the first L periods do 
not count very much because she is very patient, so her average payoff is 3. However, player two 
puts more weight on the first L periods and less on everything thereafter, so her average discounted 
payoff may be considerably bigger than 0. 
9 Another famous example of a game with conflicting interests is the "Game of Chicken." See 
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seller is ps = l/n, which gives him g* = l/n, his minimax payoff. Suppose the 
payoff function of the buyer is perturbed such that with some positive probabil-
ity she will always offer p%. Then Theorem 2 applies and the buyer will get 
almost her commitment payoff of (n — \)/n on average in any Nash equilibrium 
if her discount factor is close to 1. 
Note, however, that this example is not as clear-cut as the chain store game. 
We have to assume that there is a minimal bid l/n > 0. If the buyer could offer 
pb = 0, she could hold the seller down to a minimax payoff of 0. But if he gets 0, 
the seller is indifferent between all possible prices, so he might choose ps > 0 
and we end up with no trade. The point is that bargaining over a pie of fixed 
size is not quite a game of conflicting interests. Some cooperation is needed to 
ensure that trade takes place at all. 
In Schmidt (1992) we consider a more complex extensive form game of 
repeated bargaining with one-sided asymmetric information, which confirms the 
above result that the informed player can use the incomplete information about 
his type to credibly threaten to accept only offers which are very favorable to 
him. There, however, we take a different approach and it is interesting to 
compare the two models. In Schmidt (1992) we do not allow for "all possible" 
but only for "natural" perturbations of player one's payoff function, i.e. we 
assume that there may be incomplete information about the seller's costs, 
c G [0,1]. We show that, in any sequential equilibrium satisfying a weak Markov 
property, the buyer will try to test the seller's type at most a fixed finite number 
of times, and this will happen only in the end of the game. Surprisingly (from 
the point of view of Theorem 2) we can show that the seller will get his 
commitment payoff even if he is much less patient than the buyer, so the relative 
discount factors are not crucial. Furthermore, the bargaining game we consider 
there is not of conflicting interests.
1
0 There are common interests as well, 
because players have to cooperate to some extent in order to ensure that trade 
takes place. 
5.3. Games with Common and Conflicting Interests 
"Pure" conflicting interests are a polar case and in most economic applica-
tions there are both—common and conflicting—interests present. Consider for 
example the repeated prisoner's dilemma depicted in Figure 3. In a formal 
sense this game is of conflicting interests, but our theorem has no bite. Given 
that player two takes a best response against her commitment action, player one 
would like most to commit herself to play D(efect) in every period. This holds 
player two down to his minimax payoff, but it only gives player one her minimax 
payoff as well. So, trivially she will get at least her commitment payoff in every 
Nash equilibrium. In this game the problem is not to commit to hold player two 
down to his minimax payoff, but to commit to cooperation. 
1
0 Note that not all possible perturbations are permitted. This is why conflicting interests are not 
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In the prisoner's dilemma game player one might do better if she could 
commit herself to a history dependent strategy such as "tit-for-tat". However, if 
we allow for the possibility of a " tit-for-tat" commitment type, the game is no 
longer of conflicting interests: the commitment strategy has to hold player two 
down to her minimax payoff in every period. For generic games this is only 
satisfied by stationary commitment strategies. 
If the game is not of conflicting interests, Proposition 1 shows that the lower 
bound of Fudenberg and Levine does not hold. In this case we cannot give a 
tight prediction of player one's equilibrium payoff, but our results may still be 
useful to restrict the set of equilibrium outcomes as compared to the prediction 
of the Folk Theorem.
1
1 To see this, note that our reasoning in Lemma 2 does 
not rely on the assumption that player one's most preferred commitment 
strategy is to hold player two down to his minimax payoff. If there is positive 
probability of a type who minimaxes player two, and if the normal type of player 
one chooses to mimic this type, then there can be only a finite number of 
periods in which player two does not choose a best response against the 
minimax strategy. Otherwise he would get less than his minimax payoff. Thus, if 
player one is patient enough she must get at least as much as she would get if 
she could publicly commit to the strategy that minimaxes player two. 
This is illustrated by the game depicted in Figure 4. Note that the game is not 
of conflicting interests because the strategy to which player one would most like 
to commit herself (U) does not hold player two down to his minimax payoff. 
However, player one has the option to mimic a type who always plays D. This 
minimaxes player two, so ultimately he has to take a best response against it. 
Thus, if player one is patient enough she can guarantee herself at least an 
111 am grateful to Drew Fudenberg for the following observation. REPUTATION WITH CONFLICTING INTERESTS  345 
average payoff of 2. In contrast, the Folk Theorem would predict any payoff 
bigger than 0 for player one. 
6. EXTENSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
To keep the argument as clear as possible we considered a very simple class 
of possible stage games with only two players, finite strategy sets, a countable set 
of possible types, and commitment types who always take the same pure action 
in every period. All of these assumptions can be relaxed without changing the 
qualitative results. Fudenberg and Levine (1989) provide a generalization to 
/i-player games in which the strategy sets are compact metric spaces and in 
which there is a continuum of possible types of player one.
1
2 In Fudenberg and 
Levine (1992) they show that the argument can be extended to the case where 
the commitment types play mixed strategies and to games with moral hazard, in 
which not the action of player one itself but only a noisy signal can be observed 
by player two. Since the technical problems involved in these generalizations are 
the same as in our model, we refer to their work for any formal statements and 
proofs. 
Fudenberg and Levine (1989) also demonstrated that the assumption that the 
stage game is simultaneous-move cannot be relaxed without an important 
qualification of their Theorem 1. The problem is that in an extensive form game 
player two may take an action after which player one has no opportunity to 
show that her strategy is the commitment strategy. Consider for example a 
repeated bargaining game in which in every period the buyer has to decide first 
whether to buy or not and then the seller has to choose whether to deliver high 
or low quality. If the buyer decides not to buy, then he will not observe whether 
the seller would have produced high quality. This is why the seller might fail to 
get her commitment payoff in equilibrium. Note however that this problem does 
not arise in our context. The definition of a game with conflicting interests 
assumes that the commitment strategy of player one holds player two down to 
his minimax payoff. Therefore, if player two takes an action a2 in equilibrium 
after which player one's commitment strategy a* is observationally equivalent to 
some other strategy a} =t a*, then player two cannot get more than his minimax 
payoff. So a2 must have been an element of B(a*). However, player one's 
commitment payoff is defined as gf = maxö] G/4) mina2<E g^fl,, a2). So if  player two chooses a2^B(a*) player one cannot get less than gf. Therefore, 
following Theorem 2 of Fudenberg and Levine (1989), it is straightforward that 
our result holds without qualification if g is any finite extensive form game. 
To conclude, this paper has shown that "reputation effects" give rise to a 
tight prediction of the equilibrium outcome in repeated games with conflicting 
interests. If one of the players is very patient as compared to the other player, 
then any Nash equilibrium outcome which is robust against perturbations of the 
1
2 If n > 3, the definition of a game of conflicting interests requires that a* hold all other players 
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informational structure gives her on average almost her commitment payoff. 
This indicates that the message of the Folk Theorem may be misleading. 
However, we still know very little about the evolution of commitment and 
cooperation in games in which both—common and conflicting—interests are 
present, which clearly is one of the most important issues of future research. 
Wirtschaftspolitische Abteilung, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24, D-5300 
Bonn 1, Germany 
PROOF OF LEMMA 2: Consider any equilibrium (<TX,<J2) and fix a history h' up to any period t 
along which player one has always played a*, such thai h' has positive probability given (o,,o-2). 
Such a history exists because fi* > 0. Suppose that according to the (possibly mixed) equilibrium 
strategy <T2
 +
 1 player two chooses s'2
+
 1 £B(a*) in period / + 1 with positive probability. Suppose 
further that the probability of player one not playing a* (given that he always played a* before) in 
each of the periods t + 1, / + 2, • • - , t + M is smaller than e. It will be shown that this can't be true in 
equilibrium because then player two would get less than his minimax payoff. 
Note that e is independent of t and that M has been chosen in a way to guarantee that e > 0. 
Define rr
T(al) = Prob(s[ = a{\h
T~
 l) and let V2
T(s{, a{) be the continuation payoff of player two 
from period r onwards (and including period r) given the strategy profile (s[,a2) in period r. The 
expected payoff of player two from period t + 1 onwards is given by 













(al)V2 (tf,,<72 ) 
+ Ô2 'TT  '(«Î)-{*2(«Î^2
,+M)+Ô2-^ 
It will be convenient to substract g2 from both sides of the equation in every period. (Recall that g2 
is the maximal payoff for player two if he takes an action which is not a best response against a*.) REPUTATION WITH CONFLICTING INTERESTS  347 
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By assumption the conditional probability that player one does not take her commitment action 





and, of course, we can use that ir
l
 + '(a*) < 1. Since g2 is the maximal payoff player two can get at 
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Furthermore, s'2
+] is supposed not to be a best response against a*, so 
(35) g2(ar,4
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Finally we can use that g2(a*, ar2) < g*• Substituting these expressions yields: 
(36) V{
+\al9cr2)-
82 82-82 , 
























+ (l+62 + ••• +52
A/-
,)-(^2*-|2)-(gJ-g2) 
^2-«?2 ~ ^2-«?2 , * „x 82-82 
< e T + 8? • — ~(g$-g2) +  (\- 82)
2
 2 1 -Ô2  -5, 
Recall from the statement of Lemma 2 that 
(37) 
0-*2) - (S2-É2) „ , 
e = - . — -Sf (1 -<52)>0. 
82-82 
It is easy to check that e has been chosen such that 
(38) 
(1-«2>-
Therefore we get 
l2-g2 | sM 82-82 
2 \-8?  = 82 
(39)  Vr
l(cr2)-
82  82  82 
1 - Ô, 1 - 82 1 - 5, 
However, since g2 is player two's minimax payoff, this is a contradiction to the fact that we are in 
equilibrium. Q.E.D. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1: The proof is similar to the construction of the counterexample in 
Section 3. Perturb the game g such that there are three types of player one, the normal type, the 
commitment type, and an indifferent type, whose payoff is the same for any strategy profile, with 
probabilities (1 - e), e/2, and e/2, respectively. Let 82(e) = 2/(2 + e) < 1 and suppose 52 > 82(e). 
Define 
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and let m = [//] + 2, where [n] is the integer part of n. Given the restriction on 82 it is 
straightforward to check that n is well defined and positive. 
Since the commitment payoff of player one is strictly greater than her minimax payofT, there 
exists an action â2 such that gl = #,(«*, ä2) < g* and g2= g2(a*, ä2) < g2. Suppose that g{>  minmax and g2 > minmax g2
1
3 We will now construct an equilibrium such that the limit of the 
average equilibrium payoff of the normal type of player one for 8i -> 1 is bounded away from her 
commitment payoff by at least 77, where 
(41) n = ^-[*r-*i]>0-
Suppose 
, c / 81 -ii 
where g, is the maximum payoff player one can get at all. Along the equilibrium path all types of 
player one play 0* in every period, while player two plays a* ŒB(a*) in the first m - 1 periods, 
then he plays ä2 in period m, then starts again playing a* for the next m - 1 periods, and so on. If 
player one ever deviates from this equilibrium path, player two believes that he faces the normal 
type with probability 1. In this case we are essentially back in a game with complete information 
where the Folk Theorem tells us that any individually rational, feasible payoff vector can be 
sustained as a subgame perfect equilibrium. So without writing down the strategies explicitly we 
can construct a continuation equilibrium, such that the continuation payofT is ((1/(1 -
(1/(1 - 82))g2). Clearly, the commitment and the indifferent type of player one have no incentive to 
deviate since a* is at least weakly dominant for both of them. It is easy to check that—given m>2 
and the restriction on 5,—the normal type of player one will not deviate either. 
Now suppose player two ever deviates in any period /. In this case the normal and the 
commitment type are supposed to play a* in period / + 1, while the indifferent type switches to 
another strategy s\
 +
 1 ^ a*. If player two does not observe a* being played in period t + 1, he puts 
probability one on the indifferent type. Using the Folk Theorem we can construct a continuation 
equilibrium in this subform which gives player two (1/(1 - 82))g2 and which would give the normal 
type of player one (1/(1 - 8l))gl. If, however, player two observes a* being played in period t + 1 
he puts probability 0 on the indifferent type. In the continuation equilibrium of this subform 
(a*, a*) are always played along the equilibrium path. If there is any deviation by player one, player 
two believes that he faces the normal type with probability one and—using the Folk Theorem again 
—the continuation payoff is ((1/(1 - (1/(1 - 82))g2). Clearly, always to play a* is a best 
response of player two against always a* and always a* is a best response for the commitment type 
against any strategy. It is easy to check that it is also a best response for the normal type of player 
one, given the "punishment" after any deviation. 
We have already shown that the strategies of the players form an equilibrium after any deviation 
from the equilibrium path and that, given the continuation equilibria, player one has no incentive to 
deviate from this path. We still have to check that player two's strategy is a best response along the 
equilibrium path. The best point in time for a deviation is when player two is supposed to play ä2. If 
it does not pay to deviate in this period, it never will. Suppose player two does not deviate. Then his 
payofT is given by 
m - 1 2m - 1 
(42) %)=«VESSJ'+«"SV E*2*î+-" 
/ = 1 t=m+\ 
82 6? 
= 82 + y—^ '82 - y—^7 • (82-82)-
However, if he deviates, the best he can do is to play a* in period t. In this case his payoff is given 
1
3 If for any of the players g, < minmax g, the construction of the "punishment equilibria" which 
are used below to deter any deviation from the equilibrium path is slightly more complex. In this 
case players have to alternate between the outcomes g* and g such that both get on average at 
least their minimax payoffs. 350  KLAUS M. SCHMIDT 
by 
(43) V2(a*2) =g* + ô2 • |(l - • j^- g2* + Î • TTT- i2  52
 z 2 1 -82 
32 
It is now easy to check that e and 0(e) have been constructed such that V2(ä2) > K2(a|). Thus we 
have established that this is indeed an equilibrium path. 
We now have to show that along this equilibrium path the average payoff of the normal type of 
player one is indeed smaller than g* — rj when 5t -> 1. The equilibrium payoff of the normal type is 
given by 
m — 1 2m — 1 
(44) K,= £ sr'sf+sr'ii+ £«',-'**+••• 
/ = 1 / = m + l 
1 1 8\
n 
Therefore the difference between her commitment payoff and her average payoff in this equilibrium 
is 
1-5, 5i" 
(45) g* - (1 - 8X) -V^g*-g* + -—î- • —!— • [g* 










Taking the limit for 8{ -> 1 we get 
8\"~
l . 1 
(46) lim Uî-S,] = -Uf-S,]=T?. Q-E.D. 
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